Where’s the Action? Epiphenomenalism and the Problem of Free Will
Where’s the Action? Epiphenomenalism and the Problem of Free Will
This chapter argues that Benjamin Libet’s experiments did not prove whether or not we have free will because free will is a concept that does not apply to the movements investigated by Libet. By focusing on temporality and levels of description, it suggests that a distinction must be made between the initiation and control of movement, much of which is unconscious, and the conscious exercise of free will in intentional action. In particular, the chapter examines the question of whether consciousness causes behavior in the context of epiphenomenalism and the problem of free will. It also looks at the reflective and perceptual theories of how movements are under conscious control.
Keywords: free will, Benjamin Libet, control, movement, intentional action, consciousness, behavior, epiphenomenalism, reflective theory, perceptual theory
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