Toward a Dynamic Theory of Intentions
Toward a Dynamic Theory of Intentions
This chapter outlines a dynamic theory of intentions and argues that several categories of intentions should be distinguished based on their different functional roles and the different types of contents they involve. It explains how understanding of the dynamic transitions among these different categories of intentions may elucidate the distinctive nature of actions and intentionality. It also claims that the experiments conducted by Benjamin Libet and Daniel Wegner fail to provide conclusive evidence that mental causation is generally illusory. Drawing on the causal theory of action, it also examines the phenomenology of action and of the role of conscious thought in the production of action. The chapter describes future-directed intentions, present-directed intentions, motor intentions, and the general dynamics of intentions before concluding with a discussion of conscious agency.
Keywords: intentions, intentionality, Benjamin Libet, Daniel Wegner, mental causation, causal theory of action, phenomenology, action, conscious thought, conscious agency
MIT Press Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs, and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.
