A Club Theory Approach to Voluntary Programs
A Club Theory Approach to Voluntary Programs
This chapter presents three theoretical approaches on voluntary programs, first explaining how clubs operate within traditional economic theory. They are institutions that produce and allocate public goods. The chapter credits the recent work of Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler for their advancements in the theoretical as well as empirical applications of these club concepts. The chapter also discusses the purpose, benefits, and implications of certain club standards, which specify what firms need to accomplish in order to join the club. While some clubs have relatively lenient standards, others impose certain obligations; the chapter discusses the pros and cons of both types. It looks at many more aspects of clubs, particularly how to categorize them, their size and scope, their monitoring and enforcement, and their efficacy. In conclusion, the chapter defends the importance of clubs in what they have to offer and explores how they can be improved.
Keywords: voluntary programs, club concepts, club standards, monitoring, Richard Cornes, Todd Sandler, traditional economic theory, economic theory
MIT Press Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs, and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.
