From Logic to Sociology
This chapter discusses and characterizes the gap between logical and social-institutional perspectives in terms of argumentation theory after the publication of Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions in 1962. The gap opened up by Kuhn in his analysis of normal science is a situation “in which two perspectives on the cogency of scientific argumentation opposed one another” across an area of science studies “in which scientific arguments are persuasive but not logically compelling.” The chapter emphasizes that Kuhn’s attempt at the integration of different approaches appeals to revolutionary science as an argumentative process and leads to psychological receptivity while making decisions. It also discusses Carl Hempel’s purely syntactical model of confirmation for the evaluation of cogent evidential arguments, in which he differentiates between the pragmatic and the logical aspects of cogency.
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