This book tackles the many objections against the concept of qualia, sensory experiences that are internal to the brain. There are a host of naysayers, but all of them have relied on two assumptions—the alleged nonphysical nature of qualia, and its division into given entities. These two assumptions, taken together, provide them with immediately accessible refutations. Pro-qualia views that patently did not construe qualia from the point of view of sense-datum theory were ignored; perhaps, to use the phrase in favor, they were too “freakish”—the “qualia freak” often rears its ugly head within qualiaphobe writings, but who or what the freak is and what characterizes the failures of its freakishness are never specified. Qualia has also been accused of being “non-epistemic,” i.e. they do not carry “information” about entities, but are merely “natural signs” that can be interpreted according to the motivations of the observer.
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