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The Case for Qualia$
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Edmond Wright

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780262232661

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262232661.001.0001

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A Defense of Qualia in the Strong Sense

A Defense of Qualia in the Strong Sense

(p.269) 14 A Defense of Qualia in the Strong Sense
The Case for Qualia

Barry Maund

The MIT Press

This chapter argues that the existence of such a thing as the phenomenal-qualitative character to experiences—and with it, the existence of qualia—is a noncontroversial issue, especially if taken in a weak, neutral sense. The matter of dispute lies in whether there are qualia in the strong sense. There is a firm body of opposition, which holds that the phenomenal-qualitative character can be explained in terms of the intentional content of the experiences, and that there is no need for a stronger sense of qualia. This chapter, however, presents arguments against this claim. The chapter aims to show that examining a number of the central arguments given for this position—intentionalism—shows that they do not establish the intended conclusion.

Keywords:   phenomenal-qualitative character, experiences, neutral sense, strong sense, intentional content, intentionalism

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