Phenomenal Character and the Transparency of Experience
Phenomenal Character and the Transparency of Experience
This chapter discusses qualia but uses the terms “phenomenal character,” “phenomenal differences,” and “phenomenal kinds” in its stead. The differences of phenomenal character are dependent upon the experiences that possess them, and if two experiences are alike with respect to phenomenal character concerning a particular aspect, then there is a single phenomenal kind to which they both belong. However, if qualia are understood as in some sense “uninterpreted” and as fully determinate in the way it is to experience them, then there is reason to doubt that for every phenomenal character there is a quale associated with that character. This chapter aims to defend the view that phenomenal character is intrinsic—that to have an experience with a specific phenomenal character is an intrinsic property of the experiencing subject.
Keywords: phenomenal character, phenomenal differences, phenomenal kinds, experiences, quale, intrinsic property, experiencing subject
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