Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Case for Qualia$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Edmond Wright

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780262232661

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262232661.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM MIT PRESS SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.mitpress.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright The MIT Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in MITSO for personal use.date: 06 April 2020

Experience and Representation

Experience and Representation

(p.73) 3 Experience and Representation
The Case for Qualia

William S. Robinson

The MIT Press

This chapter describes representation as a way of encapsulating obvious facts, such as the food on one’s plate and the wine in one’s wineglass. Humans do not infer a world from our experience; instead, the representation of objects in the world just is the nature of experience. It is argued here that the idea of representation has been invoked in the service of attempts to give an accounting of experience that will be compatible with physicalist principles. The primary aim of this chapter is to show that there is a tension between this use of the idea of representation and physicalism. It starts by clarifying what kinds of occurrences are being talked about when we refer to events in which “phenomenal qualities,” “phenomenal properties,” or “qualia” occur. A secondary aim is to establish a way of discussing experiences that will be as neutral as possible with respect to divergent views about their proper analysis.

Keywords:   representation, nature of experience, physicalist principles, physicalism, phenomenal qualities, phenomenal properties, qualia

MIT Press Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs, and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.