Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Strategic Bargaining and Cooperation in Greenhouse Gas MitigationsAn Integrated Assessment Modeling Approach$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Zili Yang

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780262240543

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262240543.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM MIT PRESS SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.mitpress.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright The MIT Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in MITSO for personal use.date: 27 June 2022

Modeling Global Environmental Issues as a Cooperative Game of Stock Externality Provisions

Modeling Global Environmental Issues as a Cooperative Game of Stock Externality Provisions

Chapter:
(p.9) 2 Modeling Global Environmental Issues as a Cooperative Game of Stock Externality Provisions
Source:
Strategic Bargaining and Cooperation in Greenhouse Gas Mitigations
Author(s):

Zili Yang

Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262240543.003.0002

One of the aims of this study is to bridge the gap between integrated assessment and game theoretic modeling. Within the framework of the RICE (Regional Integrated model of Climate and the Economy) model, this chapter examines various strategic and coalitional issues by seeking game-theoretic solutions of the model in this research. The framework of stock externality provision is formulated as a social planner’s optimal control problem. Climate change is a special application for the general formulation. A cooperative game of providing stock externality is then constructed as a bargaining process for shares in social welfare weights. Preparatory definitions and game-theoretic solutions in the context of the optimal control setting are introduced. Solution concepts, such as the Lindahl equilibrium and the Shapley value are defined in the dynamic setting.

Keywords:   optimal control, climate change, game theoretic modeling, social welfare weights, Lindahl equilibrium, Shapley value

MIT Press Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs, and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.