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Strategic Bargaining and Cooperation in Greenhouse Gas MitigationsAn Integrated Assessment Modeling Approach$
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Zili Yang

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780262240543

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262240543.001.0001

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Analysis of Game-Theoretic Solutions in RICE

Analysis of Game-Theoretic Solutions in RICE

(p.103) 5 Analysis of Game-Theoretic Solutions in RICE
Strategic Bargaining and Cooperation in Greenhouse Gas Mitigations

Zili Yang

The MIT Press

This chapter examines the properties of game-theoretic solutions in RICE through sensitivity analysis from an incentive perspective. The issues include intertemporal stability of the grand coalition under the Lindahl social welfare weights, the range of solutions with the core properties or having the Lindahl equilibrium properties, and incentive reactions to false perception of climate change by individual regions.

Keywords:   game-theoretic solutions, incentive reactions, sensitivity analysis, intertemporal stability, Lindahl equilibrium, climate change

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