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Strategic Bargaining and Cooperation in Greenhouse Gas MitigationsAn Integrated Assessment Modeling Approach$
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Zili Yang

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780262240543

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262240543.001.0001

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Policy Applications of Game-Theoretic Solutions in RICE

Policy Applications of Game-Theoretic Solutions in RICE

Chapter:
(p.132) (p.133) 6 Policy Applications of Game-Theoretic Solutions in RICE
Source:
Strategic Bargaining and Cooperation in Greenhouse Gas Mitigations
Author(s):

Zili Yang

Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262240543.003.0006

This chapter applies the game-theoretic solutions of RICE to some policy-related issues in climate change. It analyzes the difficulties confronted by unilateral actions such as the Kyoto Protocol from an incentive angle. It examines the sustainability of the Lindahl equilibrium solution under various unexpected shocks in economic/climate systems. It considers redistribution and transfer issues in greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation policies from game-theoretic perspectives. Furthermore, the second-best properties of subcoalitions of GHG mitigations are inspected.

Keywords:   economic systems, climate systems, climate change, Kyoto Protocol, Lindahl equilibrium, greenhouse gas mitigation

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